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Recent Books
Book Reviews
THE OTHER GoVERNMEN'J". By Mark J. Green. New York:
Viking Press. 1975. Pp. xii, 318. $12.50

I.

THE GREENING OF AMERIKA

As Karl Rossmann, a poor boy of sixteen who had been packed off to
America by his parents . . . stood on the liner slowly entering the
harbour of New York, a sudden burst of sunshine seemed to illumine the Statue of Liberty, so that he saw it in a new light, although
he had sighted it long before. The arm with the sword rose up as if
newly stretched aloft ....

F. KAFKA, Amerika 3 (1938)

The Other Government is about the power Washington lawyers
wield over the government of the United States. Author Mark Green
sets the scene for us:
As the Washington, D.C., Tourline bus creeps along Rock Creek
Parkway, the guide diligently points out the Lincoln and Jefferson
memorials, . . . Congress, the Supreme Court, the White House.
But a bus guide knowledgeable in the reality rather than the formality of Washington could have taken bis visitors by the other government-those thirty-five large law firms, of more than twenty attorneys each, which practice powerlaw. [P. 3.]
This is a particularly felicitous beginning for The Other Government.
The Tourline bus company is fictional, and none of the many Washington tour bus companies has a route that follows Rock Creek Parkway.1 In short, Mark Green's Washington could be the capital city
of Franz Kafka's Amerika. Each book, in its own way, raises genuine and difficult questions about the human condition. But, in the
course of dealing with these questions, each subtly shifts the relationship between truth and fantasy, the real and the unreal.
The Other Government in essence raises two questions. First,
do ethical principles require a lawyer to temper zeal for his client's
interest with concern for the public good? And, second, do lawyers
practicing in the national capital have any special responsibilities to
the public interest? These are hardly novel questions, and they can1. Commercial vehicles or common carriers are prohibited by regulation from operating on roadways in the National Capital Parks except by order of the Superin•
tendent of National Capital Parks. 36 C.F.R. § 50.36(a) (1975).
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not be properly elucidated here. But brief consideration of the
questions may help in analyzing how Green handles them.
A response to the first question is found in the official posture
of the American Bar Association: 2 that a lawyer is not a mere instrumentality of his client's interests but is, above all, the guardian of
our law and democratic principles. While this high-toned idea may
·not have an objective correlative in the day-to-day practice of most
lawyers, it at least articulates a norm that most lawyers accept: the
obligation to the client is secondary to the obligation to society. But
is there a conflict between this principle and the lawyer's chief function in our society, zealously to represent the interests of his client
within the bounds of law?
There is, I think, no real conflict between these principles. Our
legal system presupposes a process dominated not by interested parties but by a disinterested decision maker who is free and competent
to decide between opposing contentions. It is the existence of this
neutral decision maker that harmonizes the potential dissonance between the interests of the client and the interests of society. But
this proposition, of course, has a corollary: If the decision maker is
incompetent or corrupt, the lawyer's moral role is drastically different. An essential but unspoken assumption of The Other Government is that the corollary fits the facts. But the proof Green tenders
on the subject tells the opposite tale. 3
The second major question raised by The Other Government is
whether Washington lawyers should be subject to any distinctive ethical considerations. I think the answer is clearly yes. If the Washington lawyer is involved with business decisions of large clients, if
his work may affect many people and many interests, obviously his
ethical considerations are broader than those of a lawyer whose work
touches few. Likewise, the legislative and quasi-legislative processes-areas in which Washington counsel are often helpful to clients-may present ethical concerns that differ from those raised in
the course of civil litigation. While litigation archetypically involves
what has already occurred and touches only the parties before the
court, legislation theoretically is forward-looking and is generally
binding. To the extent that real cases resemble the archetypes, the
Washington practitioner's ethical concerns should be atypically
broad.
The principles, as usual, are clear enough; few are likely to
quarrel with the utilitarian postulate that no lawyer can properly represent a client if the lawyer calculates that the social cost of that representation will outweigh the social benefit. The hard part is apply2. ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL
3. -See text at notes 7-14 infra.

REsPONSIBILITY,

preamble.
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ing this principle to the facts. 4 Lawyers may disagree on how the
calculation comes out in a given case depending on (1) differing
perceptions about the merits of the case; (2) differences in various
lawyers' need for money, work, or other epiphenomena of representing clients; and (3) perceptions about the social value of allowing an individual to hire a lawyer to represent him, or, stated another
way, the social cost of a legal system in which a lawyer functions
as advocate of his client's cause rather than as society's ombudsman.
The factual thesis of The Other Government is simple: that
"Washington lawyers are among the most powerful people in the
country t<>4ay" (p. 4); that they are "earthshakers and lawmakers"
(p. 9), a shadow government of lawlords (p. 15) who function, not
merely as conventional advocates, but as decision makers in their
own right, actually giving orders to agency bureaucrats (p. 9). The
work of these lawyers is based on "ten commandments": reputation, brains, information, interlocking interests, preferential access,
lobbying, law-writing, inundation, delay, and corruption (pp. 1215). These skills, says Green, are especially the tools of the famous
law firm of Covington and Burling, and of my former associate Lloyd
Cutler. 11 An examination of Green's own tale of their exploits, however, shows how tenuous is the ground upon which the thesis rests. 0
Manifestations of Covington and Burling power-lawyering do not
appear until page seventy-five, but then several are mentioned seriatim. It is first retold how in 1956 Gerhard Gesell, then the firm's
premier antitrust litigator, successfully defended du Pont in Sherman
Act litigation that went to the Supreme Court (pp. 75-76).7 The
essential question, as Green explains it, was whether there existed
any economic substitutes for cellophane. Gesell convinced the
Court that foil, glassine, and other packing materials did compete
with cellophane. Score one for the lawlords. But there follows immediately a curious passage (p. 76) that I find difficult to reconcile
with the putative theme of the book: "Gov.ernment lawyers were
aghast at the decision. But the Covington team . . . had won what
was to be, until the 1970's, the last major antitrust victory of a private
4. See J. FRANK, CoURTS ON ThIAL 14-15 (1949).
5. It would be more usual in law firm parlance to say that I was Cutler's associate and be my employer, but if associateness is not a reciprocal relationship, what
fun is it? It is important to stress this connection with Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering
at the outset, so that the reader can evaluate my criticisms of The Other Government
with this possible source of bias in mind.
6. I have been content, for the most part, to rely on the facts as Green gives
them; I do not mean, by repeating them, to warrant their accuracy. On the contrary, the book is filled with mistakes large and small, and I do not doubt that the
facts I did not check are as snarled as tte ones I did. Some of the latter I note
through the body of this review.
7. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 ( 1956).
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corporation against the government in the Supreme Court." 8 If
Gesell in fact never won another major antitrust case in the Supreme Court9 one would suppose an explanation to be in order. Had
Gesell lost his touch?
The next bit of "evidence" also involves du Pont, this time represented by Covington's Hugh Cox. The government sought to
force a divestiture of du Pont's approximately $3 billion worth of
General Motors stock and at length succeeded (pp. 77-79). "Cox
had lost his biggest case," Green tells us (p. 79).
Further evidence of the lawlords' mighty sway is found in Covington's representation of General Electric in the electrical industry
price-fixing conspiracy trial (pp. 80-83). Gesell pleaded his client
guilty and fines totalling $400,000 were levied. Several executives
of the corporation served thirty-day jail terms, an extremely rare occurrence in antitrust prosecutions. "Eight years passed before another American businessman went to jail for antitrust crime," Green
solemnly relates, "and again a Covington lawyer was involved,
deeply involved" (p. 83).
Then, "[i]n 1967 and 1968, the federal government brought
seven antitrust cases against [ITTs baking subsidiary], three criminal and four civil; the government won all seven'' (p. 88). Green
sums up: "Whatever Covington's role in these Justice Department
cases, no one can doubt their significance" (p. 96). I, for one, do
not doubt their significance. What they signify is that Covington and
Burling's much-vaunted "power'' does not appear to include the
power to manipulate the outcomes of important cases. Virtually all
the evidence Green tenders on this subject shows that the "earthshaker-lawmaker" picture lacks verisimilitude.
Lloyd Cutler fares little better in Green's hands. Cutler appears
to hold a strange fascination for Green, who compares him to Mao
Tse-tung (p. 55) but leaves it open whether Cutler is an "evil genius" (p. 169)10 or a "guiding genius" (p. 252).11 Green gives Cut8. Whether this assertion is true, I suppose, turns on what you think a major case
is. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy P•rods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); FfC
v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958); FfC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S.
396 (1958).
9. Gesell was appointed judge of the District Court for the District of Columbia
in 1967. I have no idea what Gesell's box score was between 1956 and 1967. See
note 6 supra.
10. Deadpans Green: "Not surprisingly, Cutler is sensitive to such criticisms" (p.
169).
11. Green's Cutler is definitely, however, "hardworking and hustling'' (p. 49),
even to the point, we are told, of a bit of discreet self-promotion. In connection
with the American Airlines campaign contribution scandal, for example, Cutler reportedly advised the airline, his client, to "come clean," and as part of his strategy
spread the word of American's confession through the news media. According to
Green, "Cutler called Washington Post executive editor Benjamin Bradlee to elaborate on American's admission and his own role in the episode. Bradlee thought this
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ler credit for a "polished demeanor" (p. 61) and bushy eyebrows
(p. 58). But does Cutler lawmake and earthshake? Can Cutler
part the waters of bureaucracy so that his rich clients might cross
on dry land? As with Covington, the proof fails to meaure up to
the pleading. For example, Cutler participated on behalf of CBS
in the FCC's hearings on the so-called fifty-fifty rule, proposed to
prohibit networks from supplying their affiliates with more than fifty
percent of regularly scheduled prime time series programming (pp.
223-24). Cutler argued, Green tells us, that there were not enough
sponsors willing to assume the risk of underwriting non-network
shows and that CBS was supplying the public with the programming
they wanted anyway. But the Commission nevertheless went ahead
with a version of the fifty-fifty rule, now called the prime time access
rule, which prevents the networks from programming one of the four
prime time hours nightly. 12 An individual's perception about
whether this rule is in the public interest will almost certainly turn
on whether he likes the game shows that have largely filled the void
that the networks have been obliged to leave in the. evening sched-

ule. is
Green tenders another example of Cutler's extraordinary influence: the 1970 merger plans of American and Western Airlines
excessive self-promotion, but the Post story did laud" American's candor in the incident (p. 48). Curious about how Green could tell what Bradlee thinks, I called the
Washington Post for clarification. I read Bradlee the entire paragraph in which the
excerpted sentence appeared and asked him: "How does Mark Green know what you
think?" "Beats the shit out of me," he explained. Elaborating, Bradlee told me that
he remembers having a conversation with Green but denies the thought about Cutler
that Green attributes to him. Telephone conversation, July 23, 1915.
To illustrate the unusual services Cutler can supply to his clients, Green writes:
"After Cutler spoke to his friend James Reston about corporate contributions, Reston
produced a Times column urging firms which had made illegal gifts to admit their
guilt" (p. 48). Since the implication is clear that Cutler can induce Reston to write
columns favorable to Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering clients, I called the Washington
bureau of the New York Times for confirmation. Reston was indignant at the suggestion that Cutler or anyone else could cause him to . produce a column. "It's a
calumny on Cutler, really," Reston told me, and added, "I've known him for 2S years,
and never once has he suggested to me what I should write in a column." Telephone
conversation, Aug. 11, 1915.
12. 47 C.F.R. § 73.6S8(k) (1974).
13. Surveys consistently show that Americans do enjoy watching television. See
generally R. BOWER, TELEVISION AND THE Ptrauc ( 1973).
The prime time access rule will probably be with us for a long time to come.
See National Assn. of Independent Television Producers & Directors v. FCC, S16
F.2d S26 (2d Cir. 1975); National Assn. of Independent Television Producers & Directors v. FCC, S02 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1974); Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC,
442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971 ). The ostensible purpose of the rule is to promote diversity but, in essence, it is simply a welfare benefit for the producers of game shows,
who would otherwise have insurmountable difficulties in competing with the producers of regular prime time fare. The entire subject, together with an explanation of
why the prime time access rule will never work, is discussed with exceptional wit
and learning (if I do say so myself) in Second Report and Order in Docket No.
19622, SO FCC 2d 829, 889 (1975) (Robinson, Commr., dissenting).
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(pp. 200-06). To secure this result, says Green, Cutler and his
client "launched a lobbying campaign impressive even for the welltraveled corridors of Washington agencies" (p. 201). They visited
with four of the five members of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the
head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, officials in the
White House and the Department of Transportation, and Treasury Secretary Connally; their "drumfire succeeded in inspiring transportation summitry" (p. 204). The Antitrust Division opposed the
merger, however, and in the subsequent face-off between the government and The Other Government, the former, as usual, prevailed.
These tales of lost lawsuits and disappointed hopes are not meant
to imply that Washington lawyers do not deliver a worthwhile service
to their clients. I intend only to suggest that they cannot deliver
particular results unless they can persuade The Original Government
-the one I work for-to see things their clients' way. This persuasion, in my experience, has essentially involved straight lawyering
-reasoned argument, on the merits, with the relevant private interests fully disclosed. Green's own showing decisively points to the
conclusion that The Original Government is quite up to its task of
refereeing the revenue-producing activities of business. In short,
The Other Government appears to confirm the assumption that there
exists a disinterested decision maker that is free and competent to
choose the public interest from among opposing contentions. The
verification of this assumption, in tum, has an important bearing on
the morality of representing a client with whose views the lawyer
does not necessarily agree. 14

II.

OF PEANUT BUTTER, INSANITY, AIRBAGS,
AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST

The chief intellectual shortcoming of The Other Government is
its many facile assumptions about the public interest. Green appears to believe that good and evil go around unmasked, equally obvious to all, and that only greed and perversity can explain differences among people about the identity of each. But most practicing
lawyers find themselves at work in a far more complex world.
14. I strongly suspect that Green and many other members of the bar overrate
the efficacy of Washington counsel in influencing policy. Many Washington firms,
it is true, have talented and energetic people working for them; but agencies also have
such people, and the agency people, in the last analysis, are the ones who have the
say about how things are going to be. In many cases, lawyers or lobbyists give the
illusion of influence by making personal contacts with government officials that any
half-resourceful person could easily arrange for himself. How and whether such personal contacts affect policy formation is another question, and one that doubtless
has a great many different answers. However, after a year's personal experience in
government, I am deeply skeptical of claims that the special access and charisma of
super-lawyers exert much influence on government policy. The boring truth seems
to be that for the most part policy is generated by staff bureaucrats.
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Safe cars and safe drugs, for example, are undeniable goods, but
the question is never presented whether, ceteris paribus, society
would rather have safe drugs and cars or unsafe drugs and cars. The
question is always how much each attainable increment of safety is
going to cost. The cost of producing an automobile or a drug that
could not injure a human being would be so high that no one would
be able to get any benefit from either.is Whether one believes that
an increment of benefit is worth the cost · increment is a value
choice about which people may differ. Society therefore needs political institutions designed to mediate differences between people
in particular cases. The lawyer's special province is to administer
one of the more important of these mediating institutions-the judicial system. But one of the necessary conditions of this trusteeship
is a degree of professional detachment about which substantive policies shall be adopted in any given case. If lawyers are not prepared
to tolerate institutions that are capable of generating policy results
to which they cannot personally subscribe, then lawyers become
priests and the law a sort of theology that exalts the correctness of
substantive outcomes over fair procedures for reaching them.
There is nothing absurd about the lawyer-as-priest. Theocracies, in one form or another, have probably been the dominant form
of government since civilization began. But intolerance of substantive policies fairly arrived at, just because they are contrary to one's
own view, is inconsistent with democratic theory and is, more often
than not, based on some doubtful assumptions about the nature of
the public interest. The public interest simply does not occur in the
wild, sub specie aeternitatis, independent of anyone's values.
The fugitive character of the public interest is illustrated by one
of the examples Green uses for just the opposite purpose-the peanut
butter rule-making, in which Covington and Burling participated at
great and laborious length (pp. 132-40). When, in 1959, the Food
and Drug Administration considered what recipe should be prescribed
in the peanut butter food standard,16 it had no access to the Platonic
Caves wherein the Idea of Peanut Butterness is kept. Green, one
gathers from the book, practically lives in the Platonic Caves and
could probably tell you right offhand the maximum percentage of
partially hardened vegetable oil that may be added to ground peanuts
before the concoction stops being peanut butter and starts being something else (p. 133-34).17 But the FDA was required to make its deter15. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE CosTS OF ACCIDENTS 17-20 (1970).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1970), provides: "Whenever in the judgment of the [FDA]
such action will promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers, [it]
shall promulgate regulations fixing and establishing for any food, under its common
or usual
name so far as practical, a reasonable definition and standard of identity.
,,
17. One bit of information that is evidently not kept in the caves is the distinction
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mination on the basis of record evidence compiled at a hearing. That
this was no easy task can be illustrated by an experiment. Pulverize
two cups of peanuts in a blender; the result will be a thick, syrupy
substance like that sold in some stores as "old fashioned peanut butter." It is a good, inexpensive substitute for tahini paste if you are
making hommos,18 but it tastes chalky and coats the inside of your
mouth like tar. In order to make a product that most people will
find acceptable as peanut butter, some hydrogenated vegetable oil
must be added. Green implies that the industry had only one goal:
getting FDA permission to use the smallest possible proportion of
peanuts to the cheaper vegetable oil.
Assuming that peanut butter manufacturers are profit maximizers, it is questionable whether it is in their best interest constantly to cheapen the product without lowering the price. While
each manufacturer will cut costs all it can, its highest priority will be
to increase its market share. This, in turn, will require that the
product be formulated with continuing reference to consumer tastes.
In a relatively competitive line of commerce like peanut butter, a
maximum-flexibility standard would allow for widely different peanut
butters, and the preferences of consumers, rather than the authoritative pronouncement of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, would
decide which was the "real" peanut butter and which were either
(1) too much like tan Crisco, or (2) too much like tahini paste.
I do not know that the FDA standard does not, in fa~t, allow
for sufficient variation in the product to make such competition feasible. But I have a suspicion, based on three years' experience as
a group worker with children, that it does not. At least half of my
former charges preferred butter or margarine on their peanut butter
sandwiches. Putting margarine on peanut butter sandwiches has the
same effect as increasing the percentage of vegetable oil in the peanut
butter. Yet manufacturers that want to sell a product more nearly
in accord with the tastes of these consumers must sell it as "peanut
spread" or "imitation peanut butter." Either of these nomenclatures
might present a difficult obstacle to the marketing of a new product, 19 and, as a result, many consumers must do without a peanut
between vegetable oil and lard. The latter is the rendered fat of animals, especially
swine. Vegetable oil is not lard. See J. RoMBAUER & M. RoMBAUER, Joy OF CooKING 510 (2d ed. 1964). Compare, however, Green's assertion to the contrary on p.
134.
18. Hommos (sometimes spelled "hummus") is made by homogenizing chick
peas, lemon juice, sesame paste (talzini or tahina) and a couple of tablespoons of
olive oil with garlic.
19. We shall see. About a year-and-a-half ago, Kraftco Corporation introduced
a nonstandard product called Koogle, which is sold as "peanut spread." It cannot
be sold as peanut butter because it has flavoring added-chocolate, vanilla, cinnamon, and banana. According to Dr. J.B. Stein of the Kraft Foods Division of
Kraftco, with whom I spoke on Aug. 4, 1975, the amount of fat in Koogle does not
exceed that allowed in the peanut butter standard. Whether Koogle will survive in
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spread they can enjoy without doctoring it with margarine. The
great food processing conglomerates, of course, lose little: they
make margarine as well as peanut butter.
Even where the public interest seems clear at one time, later
events may show it is not so. One of the greatest public interest triumphs of the young Abe Fortas was persuading the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1954 to
adopt the Durham rule for insanity-that a person is not responsible
for criminal misconduct that is the product of a "mental disease or
mental defect." 20 At the time, it was widely considered a progressive, forward-looking rule. 21 But almost immediately, problems began to arise. What is a "mental disease or defect" for the purposes
of the test? 22 What connection between the mental illness and the
criminal act is necessary in order to characterize the latter as the
"product" of the former? 23 How can psychiatrists be permitted to
testify on these matters without foreclosing the very issue the jury
is supposed to decide? 24 Finally, in 1972, the D.C. Circuit scrapped
Durham for the American Law Institute's definition of insanity. 20
Fortas probably never undertook a matter for a paying client that
the marketplace remains to be seen. The FDA has recently announced plans to "es•
tablish a common or usual name for spreadable peanut products that fail to meet the
standard of identity for peanut butter." 40 Fed. Reg. 51,052 (1975).
20. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
21. See, e.g., deGrazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHI, L REV. 339
(1955); Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness-Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22
U. CHI. L. REv. 320 (1955).
22. See Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957); McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
23. See Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957). One senses a
court near despair in the following passage:
When we say that the defense of insanity requires that the act be a "product
or• a disease, we mean that the facts on the record are such that the trier of
the facts is enabled to draw a reasonable inference that the accused would not
have committed the act he did commit if he had not been diseased as he was.
There must be a relationship between the disease and the act, and that relationship, whatever it may be in degree, must be, as we have already said, critical
in its effect in respect to the act. By "critical" we mean decisive, determinative,
causal; we mean to convey the idea inherent in the phrases "because of," "except
for," "without which," "but for," "effect of," "result of," "causative factor."
252 F.2d at 617.
24. See Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 862-64 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger,
J., concurring); Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See
also United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring). In 1961, then Circuit Judge Burger wrote: "[IJn the short span since
1954 this court has written some 70 opinions growing directly out of the 'diseaseproduct' test. In large part . . . the inordinate number of appeals and appellate opinions in this jurisdiction stems from the vagueness, lack of clarity, and the psychiatric
orientation of that test and from its departure from accepted legal concepts in the
juzy instruction." Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(Burger, J., concurring).
25. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Brawner re•
counts the histozy of the insanity defense in the Circuit since Durham.
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produced more unfortunate results. Durham was an unmitigated
disaster for the courts and probably never eased the plight of a single
insane person in the District of Columbia through its seventeen years
of life. But that is precisely the point about good and evil: it is
often terribly hard to tell them apart ahead of time. While careful
reflection on the policy options and competing concerns may not improve outcomes in every case, it "Seems prudent to behave as if it
would. Such reflection is best promoted by the adversary process,
which in tum suggests that a party should not have to win his case
before he can get a lawyer.
In other situations the alternatives and concerns are not hidden,
but the morally "right" result may.nevertheless be difficult to reach.
Green discusses the "air bag" matter (pp. 183-85), for example,
which, though he does not recognize it, involves competition between incommensurable values. In 1972, Ford Motor Company and
several other automobile manufacturers went to court to overturn
standard 208 of the National Highway Traffic Administration
(NHTA). 26 This standard required that automobiles, beginning
with the 1974 model year, be equipped with passive occupant-restraint devices with specified performance characteristics. 27 As a
practical matter, this standard required crash-inflated airbags. According to Green (p. 183), "The idea is that when a car stops dead,
the passengers won't." 28 John H. Pickering, Lloyd Cutler's partner,
argued on behalf of Ford that, among other things, the standard's
performance specifications were not sufficiently objective to allow
compliance because of defects in NHTA's own testing procedures.
Green saw this as "a typical public interest-private interest battle"
(p. 184) in which there was no doubt where the public interest lay:
he claimed that any delay in instituting the air bag standard
would cause "thousands of people . . . needlessly [to] die" (p.
185). But the court saw it differently:
The importance of objectivity in safety standards cannot be overemphasized. The Act puts the burden on the manufacturer to assure
that his vehicles comply under pain of substantial penalties. In the
absence of objectively defined performance requirements and test
procedures, a manufacturer has no assurance that his own test results
will be duplicated in tests conducted by the Agency. Accordingly,
such objective criteria are absolutely uecessary so that "the question
of whether there is compliance with the standard can be answered by
26. Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 663 (6th Cir. 1972).
27. 472 F.2d at 664.
28. When I read that sentence, I thought that I would at least have to give Green
credit for having turned a clever phra'i;e. Then I read the opinion of Peck, J., in
Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 663 (6th Cir. 1972), where
the following explanation of occupant-restraint devices appears: "The idea is to assure that when the car stops dead, the passengers don't."
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objective measurement and without recourse to any subjective determination. " 29

What is the "right" result? On the one hand is the contention
that manufacturers' resistance to the use of air bags will cause the
loss of many lives. The competing contention is that the conduct
supposedly required by the rule has not been declared with the clarity demanded by what Professor Fuller calls the "inner morality
of law." 30 Partisanship aside, 31 it seems to me that the issue is one
of genuine difficulty. Green, ironically, is correct in calling this
case "typical": 32 the court's conclusion is typical of what one would
expect where a high value is placed on regularity of government action. A similar question is before an appellate court every time a
convicted defendant asks for a retrial because crucial evidence was
unreasonably seized or the jury was improperly instructed. In such
cases, we pretermit (or everu assume) the substantive correctness
of the result and ask whether the process was fair.
ill.

THE BROWNING OF THE PuBLIC 1NTEREST33
Would you have your songs endure?
Build on the human heart.

R. Browning, Sordel/o (1840)

The failures of The Other Government are not limited to intellectual ones. It also suffers from failures of the heart, and these
are by far its most serious flaws. First, there is a studied evasiveness
about the prose as though Green were somehow ambivalent about
standing behind many of the tl:hings he wishes us to understand: "To
admirers, [John W.] Davis's soaring response remains the classic
explanation of the lawyer's role. But others wonder exactly what
29. Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 675 (6th Cir. 1972).
30. L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (1964).
31. This case was argued and decided when I was a Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering
associate. I suppose that makes me an ex officio partisan, although I had nothing
to do with the case.
32. As always, Green's analysis of the problem is contemptuous and cavalier:
"What is good enough for GM engineering should be good enough for Cutler. But
he supported instead a client (Ford) who didn't believe in air bags, even though his
other client (GM) did. As Lloyd Cutler once said with firmness in an interview,
he believes in ·the arguments he makes" (p. 185). I cannot understand why Lloyd
Cotler ought to be bound by what GM engineers think, although if Green would
agree to be bound by the same criterion I should not wonder if a deal of some sort
could be worked out. In the meantime, however, it is silly to suggest that Cutler
is guilty of hypocrisy because his firm's clients do not all have identical interests.
No issue of professional ethics arises where full disclosure is made to clients with
potentially conflicting interests and their assent to their lawyer's proposed representation is obtained. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILllY, DR 5-105. I
leave to one side whether it is correct to treat Piokering as merely Cutler's alter ego.
33. This pun is borrowed from Professor Philip B. Kurland's address to the Mi11nesota Law Review dinner in May of 1971.
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philosophy it was that required Davis to devote his professional life to
the House of Morgan" (pp. 268-69) . "To his admirers, [Cutler]
is the model of the modern lawyer, but his critics would sentence
him to the eclectic chair" (p. 45). Peter Hutt's "food lawyering,
his pro bono work, his boyish looks and disarming openness made
him a [Covington] wunderkind," but when he became chief counsel for FDA and refused to publish the firm's client list, he "greatly
upset public-interest lawyer Anita Johnson, who wondered how the
public could tell whether Hutt should take himself off future cases."
(pp. 30-31). This technique might be called the Nixon euphuism:
criticisms are advanced ex nihilo or by third persons and seldom
supported with reasons. The Nixon euphuism gives an author "plausible deniability" for the things that he writes and frustrates reasoned
debate. It is a technique best avoided.
Another failure of the heart is reflected in the incoherence of
the book's organization; it suggests an unsettling contempt for the
whole undertaking. Despite the author's assurance that the book
had a gestation period of five years (p. vii), there is strong textual
evidence that The Other Government was rushed into print.34 Nor
is the evidence of perfunctory craftsmanship formal only. Substantively, The Other Government wanders around in a wilderness of
trivia, confusion, and malice. For example, as chapter one ends we
are still awaiting evidence that Washington lawyers are "earthshakers and lawmakers." But chapter two has quite a different purpose
-anthropology. Its mission is to show that Covington and Burling
is "a culture as well as a law firm" (p. 31). But this is curious
anthropology; rather, it is an odd ragbag of facts, nonfacts, gossip,
and opinions. Thus, we start with the assertion that the firm is the
city's most influential-the Everest of Washington practice (pp. 1624). Next is a short historical sketch, beginning with the firm's origins during the Wilson Administration (pp. 20-25) and ending with
the assertion that the firm is "very much an institution in flux" (p.
25). Following this assertion are biographies of three firm lawyers,
Dean Acheson, H. Thomas Austern, and Peter B. Hutt (pp. 2531), that appear to illustrate just the opposite point. 35 There fol34. In addition to many apparent proofing errors, see, e.g., pp. 37 note, 138, 166,
are assorted giddy howlers like: "[Washington lawyers] are to all lawyers and citizens what the heart is to the body: by dint of central location and essential function,
both are the reigning organs of their respective body politic" (p. 4) and "Is [pro bono
work] built into the law firm's structure or merely random events?" (p. 244). Such
defects, to my mind, are autoptical proof of insouciance at least.
35. From Acheson to Austem to Hutt, the firm has shown a consistent preference
for graduates of the Harvard Law School who have stamina, brains, and a taste for
representing business corporations.
Green does eventually get around to proffering some evidence of Covington in
flux; he says the firm's representation of airline clients has dropped off in recent
years (p. 200). I cannot say whether this is true or not. See note 6 supra.

160

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:148

lows the fact that the firm has a large support staff (p. 37) and the
nonfact that associates are expected to bill eighty hours every two
weeks (p. 38), We are also given some soft-core gossip: certain
Covington lawyers have known drinking problems (p. 31), and a
lawyer there was discovered one Saturday morning rolling on the office floor with his secretary (pp. 31-32). Finally, we come to a passage tinted with the sunset, which suggests that Covington may, in
fact, be over the hill: "Great institutions come, peak and decline,
from the British East India Trade Company to Life magazine to the
New York Yankees, and it is only in retrospect that we learn that
moment in time when events conspired to undo institutional inevitability" (p. 44).
Well, which is it to be? Tenzings on the Everest of powerlaw,
or the Yankees on their way to the cellar? Since both propositions are
expounded and neither is anywhere illustrated, it presumably does
not matter. Although both assertions could be false, they could not
both be true.
Another failure of the heart-this, I think, the most objectionable of all-is found in Green's positive tropism toward malicious
innuendo. Take, for example, what Green calls "the Fazzano episode." "Exactly who is Joseph Fazzano?" asks Green (p. 89). Unfortunately, The Other Government never answers this question, although it is clear that Green sees a menacing aura round him. All
we are told about Fazzano is that he is a Hartford lawyer who was
hired by ITT, apparently for the purpose of representing IITs interest before the Connecticut Insurance Commission, when the conglomerate was attempting to acquire the Hartford Fire Insurance
Company. ITT had also retained Covington as well as a large Hartford law firm in connection with this acquisition. Henry Sailer, a
Covington lawyer on the case, did not know who Fazzano was (pp.
89-90). Does this suggest the existence of impropriety? To me,
it suggests nothing at all; yet by the time we .get to the last chapter,
Fazzano's name is inexplicably linked with Dita Beard and the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile as evidence of ITI's bad
character, and Covington's (p. 273).
And then there are times where innuendo gives way to outright
accusations of personally and professionally disgraceful behavior.
Did you know, for example, that a certain Covington partnevGreen names him, though I shall not-"does not particularly like
black people"? This, according to Green, is "obvious to fellow lawyers" (p. 199). Or did you know that another (unnamed) Covington lawyer destroyed unidentified evidence of a client's criminal conduct (p. 70)? And how about H. Thomas Austern's unethical behavior in citing precedents to government officials? At least four
times Austern is in effect called a knave, a bully, or worse for this
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offense. 36 And what of the "ex parte" contacts Washington counsel
so frequently have with public officials? Well-what about them?
In his dark references to private (p. 201) or "ex parte" (p. 202)
meetings between businessmen or their lawyers and government officials, Green muddles the distinction between contacts that are forbidden by agency rules and those that are not and leaves the reader
who does not know better with a sinister, and inaccurate, impression.
Administrative agencies, whether inside the executive branch or independent, are not courts and are not supposed to conduct their business in an ivory tower, aloof from the teeming and intricate commerce they were established to regulate. On the contrary, agencies
have a special expertise in the matters under their superintendence
and do not, as a rule, go to pieces when people in the regulated industries seek to express their desires. Bureaucrats find many such
meetings useful and constructive and are at least as available to
members of the general public, including self-styled representatives
of the public interest, as to businessmen and their lawyers.
IV.

THE ETHICS OF POWERLAW AND THE
ETHICS OF DECENCY

Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of
many things that were not so.
Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1918)

In connection with its various difficulties in advertising its products, the tobacco industry hired Covington and Burling's Austem and
a former Senator named Earle Clements. According to The Other
Government, Clements was to specialize in communications with
Congress, while Austern was to handle other matters. To Green
"this raises the difficult issue of whether lawyers can or should ethically compartmentalize their advocacy, and not assume responsibility·
for client advocacy from which they are carefully insulated. Involved is a contradiction of cliches: Does the right hand not know
what the left hand is doing? Or does one hand wash the other?"
(pp. 152-53).
I leave it to the reader to sort out the meaning of this meditation, and mention only that it typifies the clarity of Green's thinking
on legal ethics. The last chapter of The Other Government is entitled "The Ethics of Powerlaw," and its burden is to propose "a new
lawyers' ethic": that a lawyer ought in every case to "make a judgment about the likely impact [of his representation] on the public,
and if the client desires tactics based on political influence or seeks
a demonstrable though avoidable public harm, he should quit the account" (p. 287; italics omitted). Green quotes a Wilmer, Cutler,
36. See p. 135 (knave); pp. 97, 273 (bully); p. 145 (worse).
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and Pickering recruiting memorandum that expresses the same
thought: "We decline to represent clients whose objectives or tactics we find unacceptable, or who ask us to represent a position on
any basis other than its merits" (p. 282). Both of these statements
accord with the utilitarian calculus laid down as a truism at the beginning of this book review. 37
It is a comfort to know that there is at least one thing about
which both Cutler and Green can agree, even if it is only a truism.
Unfortunately, as Green recognizes (pp. 287-88), this truism leaves
intact all the problems. Where Green and many other lawyers1, for one-would disagree most radically is on the value to be assigned to giving even a bad client the benefit of process before deciding what should be done with him. We see the existence of process as so important to the idea of justice, both in a theoretical and
in a practical sense, that we are even willing to tolerate injustice in
particular cases in order to maintain the integrity of governmental
processes over the long pull. For Green, however, the axis of decision is always substantive right and wrong; his conception of right
is usually vivid and seldom alloyed by doubt. Accordingly, the
whole idea of regular process seems senseless to him. It is worth
reflecting, however, that the same logic that makes nonsense of giving General Motors the benefit of process38 also makes nonsense of
the idea of democracy. Why give General Motors a fair trial if its
guilt is self-evident? Why ask people who ought to be President
if the answer is indisputable? It is a rather totalitarian world view
that assumes that "true" public policy can be extracted from the raw
material of experience, dialectical argument, or a leader's vision
without some mediating political process.
31. See text at note 4 supra.
38. Green generally objects to equating the rights of juridical and biological persons. On the subject of guilty clients, he quotes Austern's question to a law student,
''Would you represent Sirhan Sirhan?" (p. 279). Green turns this question aside with
a very dark and difficult argument: "[l]t seems odd to compare Sirhan Sirhan . • •
with General Motors. The former is alone, impecunious, without political entree,
and capable of being victimized unless stoutly defended. General Motors has more
assets than most countries and cannot be similarly outclassed or victimized by a government it can influence in numerous ways" (p. 279). Green does put bis finger,
of course, on a number of undeniable differences between General Motors and Sirhan
Sirhan. But surely Austem was aiming at a different point: bow one justifies defending a client one knows to be guilty (or evil). Money has nothing to do with
that question, unless the argument is that only the poor and lonely are entitled to
process. I had understood Green's argument hitherto to have been that it is immoral
to defend bad clients, not rich ones.
The point about "victimization" is still harder to understand. Sirhan was defended not merely by able counsel but by several famous lawyers through a long,
costly, and vigorously contested trial. Even so, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. I have difficulty seeing what further indignity "victimization" could
have imposed on Sirhan. Sirhan's death sentence was transformed into a life term
because of the California supreme court's decision in California v. Anderson, 6 Cal.
3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972). See California v. Sirhan, 7 Cal.
3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973).
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I do not, however, accuse Green of being totalitarian. He might
become so if he reasoned some of his premises through to a conclusion, but his allergy to process extends to logic as much as to law.
He is a demagogue, though, and his unsystematic style hardly excuses the short shrift he gives to the very serious matters that The
Other Government should have treated. Instead of accepting the
challenge of discussing the ethical problems of a law practice at the
seat of national government, Green just wrote up the notes of his
legion interviews and turned them adrift in a sea of nonsense.
What makes his result the more embarrassing is the sound advice
Green received from H. Thomas Austem. Early in chapter two,
Green quotes Austem as asking whether Green had read Brandeis
and Warren's famous 1890 article, "The Right to Privacy" (p. 28).
No, Green replied. One wishes Green had taken the hint before
The Other Government went to press. If he had-assuming
Green's oft-repeated words of praise for Justice- Brandeis39 were
sincerely meant-he surely would have written a very different
book. He would, among other things, have attempted to get his
facts straight, collect his thoughts, marshal his arguments, and exclude from consideration the bratty, gratuitous attacks on other people that, I surmise, constitute The Other Government's chief commercial appeal. Brandeis, for one, would have been repulsed by ,
a treatise containing so little discussion of the merits. He and Samuel D. Warren wrote:
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.
To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread
broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip . . . . Nor is
the harm wrought by such invasions confined to the suffering of those
who may be made the subjects of journalistic or other enterprise. In
this, as in other branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand. Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the
seed of more, and, in direct proportion to its circulation, results in a
lowering of social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparently
harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil.
It both belittles and perverts . . . . No enthusiasm can flourish, no
generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence. 40
These words are eighty-five years old. And they still ring true.

Daniel D. Polsby
Legal Adviser to Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson
Federal Communications Commission
39. See, e.g., pp. viii, 281, 284.
40. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4
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